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ABSTRACT
As more applications rely on distributed systems (peer-to-peer services, content
distribution networks, cloud services), it becomes necessary to identify hosts that
return content to the user with minimal delay. A large scale map of delays would aid
in solving this problem. Existing methods, which deploy devices to every region of
the Internet or use of a single vantage point have yet to create such a map. While
services such as PlanetLab oer a distributed network for measurements, they only
cover 0.3% of the Internet. The focus of our research is to increase the speed of the
single vantage point approach so that it becomes a feasible solution.
We evaluate the feasibility of performing large scale measurements by performing
an experiment using more hosts than any previous study. First, an ecient scanning
algorithm is developed to perform the measurement scan. We then nd that a custom
Windows network driver is required to overcome bottlenecks in the operating system.
After developing a custom driver, we perform a measurement scan larger than any
previous study. Analysis of the results reveals previously unidentied drawbacks to
the existing architectures and measurement methodologies. We propose novel meth-
ods for increasing the speed of experiments, improving the accuracy of measurement
results, and reducing the amount of trac generated by the scan. Finally, we present
architectures for performing an Internet scale measurement scan.
We found that with custom drivers, the Windows operating system is a capable
platform for performing large scale measurements. Scan results showed that in the
eleven years since the original measurement technique was developed, the response
patterns it relied upon had changed from what was expected. With our suggested
improvements to the measurement algorithm and proposed scanning architectures, it
may be possible to perform Internet scale measurement studies in the future.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The idea of an Internet map has been around for quite some time [15, 32, 25, 9, 27]
due to the possible benets from knowing the delays between arbitrary hosts. This
is especially true for peer-to-peer services, content distribution networks, and cloud
services where it is desired to send content from a host closest to the end user. If a
delay map were available, it could be used as lookup table to easily nd the nearest
host. Additionally, if the map can be generated quickly enough and frequently enough,
the information can be used to nd routing problems. If links become congested or
go down entirely, the delays would become apparent in the scan results.
The time delay between arbitrary hosts is challenging to obtain since one cannot
just ask two hosts to measure the delay between themselves. Previous estimates have
been performed by deploying beacons or tracers [15] throughout the network (i.e.,
using PlanetLab [36]) and measuring the delay between those. However, it is possible
to make use of the DNS protocol to perform measurements between arbitrary DNS
servers. This technique was devised in 2002 [17], but has yet to be performed at
an Internet scale (the largest previous study used a 5000 x 5000 matrix [45]). The
primary focus of current research around delay measurements has been about making
it more accurate [26, 28, 23], and not how to perform the scans faster.
In order to perform an Internet wide delay measurement (475k x 475k), the scan-
ner will need to be able to operate at a high rate of speed and perform measurements
without negatively impacting the hosts involved. The default networking stacks avail-
able on most operating systems are not typically designed for sending a large number
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of packets at a high rate. This problem has been addressed on the Linux operating
systems by the availability of custom networking drivers [11, 12, 13, 20, 1], but none
are currently available for the Windows operating system.
Our focus in this work is to evaluate the feasibility of performing large scale mea-
surement scans. We do this by developing a scanning algorithm which can perform
measurements eciently, with minimal memory requirements, and without negatively
impacting the systems involved. A custom, high speed, networking driver has been
written to allow for the usage of the Windows operating system during the study.
The scanning algorithm is then deployed using 20,000 hosts to evaluate its capability
as well as the capability of the measurement method. Deciencies in the measure-
ment method and unexpected characteristics of the experiment's workload are also
discussed. Finally, architectures are proposed for performing a measurement scan at
an Internet scale.
2
CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
2.1 Delay Measurements via DNS
Previously, latency measurements required access to specialized nodes placed through-
out the desired network [15] or with the assistance of volunteers running special soft-
ware [27]. While those methods focused on using multiple vantage points to perform
the measurements, the usage of a single vantage point was also studied. A technique
was developed which allowed for the use of existing open, recursive DNS resolvers to
perform measurements.
2.1.1 King
The King project [17] developed a method for measuring latency using open, recursive
DNS resolvers, based on the assumption that the name servers are typically close to
the end host. The advantage of King is that it does not require the deployment of
additional infrastructure and has a signicantly larger set of nodes that can be used
for measurement. As of April 7, 2013, there were 25 million open recursive resolvers
[33], compared to PlanetLab's 1,200 nodes [36]. Developed in 2002, the King method
is widely used as a source for obtaining accurate measurements [35, 44, 2, 21, 18, 4,
5, 9, 16, 7].
2.1.2 Turbo King
The King project was improved in terms of accuracy and eciency by Turbo King
[23]. Originally, King required the use of ten DNS queries to compute the latency;
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Turbo King reduced this to six. Turbo King also addressed inaccuracies caused by the
existence of DNS forwarders and multiple name servers. It also drastically reduced
the amount of cache pollution caused by the tests.
2.2 Drivers
Developing high speed network stacks is not a new problem and has been addressed
several times on Linux operating systems [11, 12, 13, 20, 1] or through the creation
of custom network cards [38]. There has been very little [43, 40] work done on
Windows operating systems for achieving high throughput networking without the
aid of custom hardware. Cross-platform capture cards do exist that support gigabit
injection rates, but they are proprietary and cost several thousand dollars [38].
2.2.1 Intel DPDK
Intel's Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) provides a framework for developing
fast packet processing applications. It does not provide a full network stack, but the
libraries necessary to perform high speed packet processing in user space. The DPDK
was benchmarked by Intel at 10Mpps per core with 64 byte packets. The DPDK is
limited to Linux operating systems using Intel network cards. 6WIND makes use of
this library for their Intel specic integration.
2.2.2 PF RING
A common library used in Linux for high speed networking is PF RING, developed
by ntop [12]. PF RING previously required directly patching the Linux kernel, but
newer versions are now shipped as kernel modules. The main benet of PF RING
is that packets are stored in a circular buer instead of constantly allocating and
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de-allocating memory for each packet. In the standard operation mode of the driver,
PF RING polls the network device through the Linux network interface (NAPI).
NAPI copies the packets into the circular buer and the user application reads the
packets out of the circular buer.
2.2.2.1 PF RING DNA
In version 4.7 of PF RING, ntop introduced the DNA module, allowing Direct NIC
Access. The goal of this module is to remove the NAPI polling to lower CPU usage
and reach 10 gigabit speeds for capture and injection. This is accomplished by directly
mapping the NIC memory and registers into user space so that only one memory copy
takes place; from the NIC to the user. The drawback to this approach is that it is
bound to very specic network devices, namely Intel's 1 and 10 gigabit cards.
2.2.3 6WINDGate
The 6WIND organization oers a commercial solution for developing large scale net-
work infrastructures, primarily focused on software dened networking. The
6WINDGate product is a collection of driver modules and software that run partially
in isolation from the Linux operating system by reserving several cores specically for
networking tasks. The cores are further split into processing control paths and data
paths. The data path cores provide optimized processing modules for certain proto-
col types and operate completely outside of the Linux operating system. The control
path cores interact directly with the Linux networking stack and share processing
tasks with the operating system. Similar to PF RING, this requires optimization
for specic network cards. However, due to their method of interacting with the
operating system, this solution only works with specic Linux distributions.
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2.2.4 WinPcap
On Windows, the only alternative socket library is WinPcap [43], which was largely
designed for packet capture, but does oer packet transmission. WinPcap is imple-
mented as an NDIS lter driver and avoids the problems associated with traversing
through Winsock. However, the driver allows the packets to pass through, with
no means to drop or redirect packets. This means that the receive path will suer
from the CPU overhead of Windows processing the packets. As seen in [40], while
WinPcap's multi-destination performance is somewhat better than Winsock's, it still
requires 75% CPU to reach that rate.
2.2.5 IRLstack
Our research lab has previously worked on a driver for Windows that has improved
performance over Winsock and WinPcap [40]. This driver was designed and tested on
Windows 2008 SP2, but no longer works properly on Windows 2008 R2 SP1 or Win-
dows 8. Furthermore, the receive side performance is degraded when passing packets
from the kernel level to user space. This can result in packets being dropped when
running at high rates. In order for this driver to be suitable for incorporation into
other research projects, it would need to have its design re-evaluated and corrected.
6
CHAPTER III
IRLSTACK 2.0
The primary eort in performing delay measurements has typically been focused on
improving the accuracy of the results. While this is important, it is also desirable
to rapidly perform large scale measurements to obtain snapshots of the Internet as a
whole. In order to do that, the tools used to perform the measurements need to be
ecient. Improvements have been made for Linux users, but improvements for the
Windows operating system have been lacking.
3.1 Motivation
One of the major hurdles to performing an Internet wide delay measurement is that
most operating systems' network stacks are not capable of performing well with a
large number of connections. Previous work has modied the Linux kernel's network
drivers directly to work around these problems. Windows, however, is essentially a
black box since the operating system's source code is not available.
Windows provides a networking API called Windows Sockets (Winsock) for ap-
plication level users to easily interact with network devices. The API abstracts away
the inner workings of the underlying protocols, such as TCP/IP, and allows users to
easily send and receive data. Over the years, the Windows network stack has evolved
to oer more capabilities, such as a closely integrated rewall, network discovery,
transport providers, and more. As a result, the Winsock API now sits several layers
above the kernel level networking API. By passing data through so many layers, a de-
lay is incurred between the time when a packet arrives and when it is sent to the user.
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This delay is typically not noticed in most situations, but it becomes a bottleneck
when an application is designed to communicate with a large number of destinations.
In Windows Server 2008, it was previously possible to disable the Windows Fire-
wall service and the Network List services to avoid passing through some of the more
expensive network layers [40]. This no longer appears to be the case for Windows
Server 2008 R2. Testing showed that Winsock could not exceed rates of 150,000
packets per second to a single destination with the services enabled or disabled. In
order to perform large scale network scanning, an application will need to connect
to a large number of unique destinations at a single time. Windows incurs an ad-
ditional penalty in this situation. As the number of unique destinations increases,
the throughput rapidly degrades. With the previously mentioned services disabled,
it was not possible to exceed 20,000 packets per second with all unique destinations
in our tests. As can be seen in Table I, increasing the number of threads (six cores
were available, with one socket per thread) did not signicantly improve the sending
rate for either single destination tests or multiple destination tests.
Rate in pps
Socket Type Destination 1 Thread 2 Threads 3 Threads 6 Threads
Regular single 108,448 145,730 146,002 146,751
all unique 15,433 16,715 16,926 19,002
Raw UDP single 113,017 146,101 146,326 147,014
all unique 15,582 16,772 16,751 18,570
Raw IP single 123,314 127,730 144,626 145,879
all unique 15,396 16,851 16,595 19,429
Table I. Windows Server 2008 R2 using Winsock to send 1,000,000 UDP packets with
100B payloads
Networking on Windows revolves solely around Winsock, with no third-party
libraries available. The only option available was to implement our own network
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driver. Windows provides multiple kernel level driver extensions for authors to use
to interact with the network. At the top is the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP),
which allows for packet inspection and modication. Below that is the Winsock
Kernel (WSK), which provides a socket-like interface at the kernel level. At the very
bottom is the Network Driver Interface Specication (NDIS) API driver, which acts
as a wrapper for accessing the Network Interface Card (NIC). WFP would allow us
to lter out the packets we are interested in, but we would still not be able to solve
the bottleneck that occurs while sending packets. WSK would allow us to bypass the
user space layers, but packets must still be processed by the Windows TCP/IP stack.
For our purposes, we do not need Windows to perform any processing on the packets,
so that just leaves the very last layer, NDIS. NDIS allows us to send and receive
packets directly above the NIC without passing through any of the other Windows
networking layers.
3.2 Overview
Since Windows does not provide access to its kernel directly, nor many of its libraries,
it is not possible to patch the Windows networking API (Winsock). However, Win-
dows does provide the ability to mount custom drivers into the middle of the network
stack. This allows users to redirect packets before they reach processor intensive li-
braries. There are multiple types of network drivers available (miniport, lter, and
protocol) and two of them will be employed in this project. See Figure 1 for the new
network path which bypasses the Windows libraries. A lter driver will rewrite the
protocol type of packets of interest and a protocol driver will be registered to accept
that custom protocol. Since it will be using a non-standard protocol type, the packet
will not be sent to the Windows TCP/IP protocol driver and thus avoids unnecessary
9
Kernel
User Space
Hardware
tcpip.sys
Protocol
drivers
Filter
drivers
Miniport
drivers
IRLlwf.sys
IRLprot.sys
ws2_32.dll
afd.sys
IRLsocket
IRLndis
Fig. 1. Network path through kernel
overhead.
3.2.1 Lightweight Filter Driver
The lter driver's only purpose is to ag packets of interest for the protocol driver.
This is done by checking the IP address of the inbound packet. If the packet is
destined for an IP address that is not the primary IP address of the computer, the
packet's Ethernet type will be rewritten to 0xABAB. Any packet that is not an IP
packet or is sent to the primary IP address will be allowed to simply pass through
the driver without modication. By redirecting packets this way, the custom drivers
will not impact the operating system's normal networking capabilities when they
are activated. Any experiment that needs to use the drivers can be performed on
secondary IP addresses.
3.2.2 Protocol Driver
When the protocol driver is mounted, it registers two function hooks: IRP_MJ_READ
and IRP_MJ_WRITE. This provides the primary entry points into the driver from user
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space. Users cannot interact with the driver like a normal socket, instead they use
the Windows API ReadFile and WriteFile operations to read and write data on
the network device. The user space interface uses an I/O Completion Port (IOCP)
architecture, which means that the user will initially issue multiple ReadFile requests
and wait for the driver to alert them when a packet has been delivered. Each ReadFile
request creates an I/O Request Packet (IRP) inside of the driver, which signals to
the driver that an application is ready to receive packets.
3.2.2.1 Receiving Packets
When a packet arrives from the lter driver, the NdisprotReceiveNetBufferList
function of the protocol driver is invoked. One of the parameters to this function is a
list of NetBufferLists, each of which contains a set of packets from the transmission.
The rst IRP is retrieved from the queue of all pending read requests and packet
processing begins. Packets are then placed into the user space buer associated with
the current IRP. In order to minimize the number of interrupts, packets are sent to the
user in batches. Since packet lengths need to be known by the user, a custom frame
header containing the length is written to the user buer prior to writing the packet.
If the user's buer becomes full, the IRP is marked as complete. This indicates to the
driver that it needs to alert the user application that the read has completed. The
user space application is notied by an interrupt which triggers a completion packet
that the user can wait for.
The original version of this driver only processed one NetBufferList before
completing the IRP, which led to a large number of interrupts being issued and the
CPU dropping packets while it was busy servicing interrupts. To avoid that situation,
all NetBufferLists that were received are processed together. Additionally, since it
may be possible for only a few packets to have arrived in one list, it would be more
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ecient to provide as many packets at once to the user before returning the buer to
them. Therefore, packets are processed until the user's buer is completely full. A
kernel timer is used to mark the rst pending IRP as complete every 50ms to prevent
the user's buer from being held for too long.
3.2.2.2 Sending Packets
The sending side of the driver is more straightforward. A user writes the data to the
driver handle with a special frame header in front indicating the length of the packet.
This allows the sender to perform batching like the receive side does. When the
protocol driver receives the packets from the user, it creates the necessary NetBuffer
structures for the packets and places them all in a single NetBufferList structure for
sending. The list is then sent to the lter driver, which passes it on to the miniport.
3.2.3 User Space Interface
Unfortunately, since we are bypassing Winsock, it cannot be used transparently in
existing programs. Two user space classes were written to abstract away the com-
plexities of interacting with a raw protocol driver. The rst class interacts directly
with the driver and handles all of the IOCP details such as queuing up a sucient
number of read requests at all times and holding write requests for batching. The
class also provides UDP demultiplexing so that sockets can receive specic subsets
of the incoming packets. Users are able to specify which IPs and ports their socket
should receive packets for, and arriving packets are placed into queues for those sock-
ets. If a packet is destined to a local (IP, port) pair for which no socket is listening,
then that packet is simply dropped and not passed back to the Windows TCP/IP
stack.
The class which the users directly interact with is a socket-like wrapper around
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the previous class. The main functions are to set a lter (IPs and ports) to listen
for packets, bind to a destination IP address, send data, and fetch all packets that
have arrived. The last function is slightly dierent from a normal socket in that you
receive multiple packets simultaneously, instead of singularly. This requires adjusting
control logic in the application, but it allows us to reduce the amount of time locking
the packet queues.
For a detailed overview of the new kernel and user space models, see Figure 2.
3.3 Alternative Model
The current architecture could be improved upon to reduce the amount of interrupts
and memory copies that take place. The concept would be similar to how PF RING
works, with shared memory between kernel space and user space. Instead of using
ReadFile and WriteFile to generate IRPs which pass pointers to memory buers
that must be memory-mapped each time, it would be more ecient to use two shared
ring buers. When incoming packets arrive, they would be placed directly into the
shared ring. User applications can poll the head/tail pointers on the ring to see if
new packets have arrived and process them. The same could be done for the sending
side as well. The user applications place outgoing packets into a ring and the kernel
has a timer which polls for new arrivals. Batching would no longer be needed on
the receive side since interrupts would not be generated since IRPs are not being
used. The sending side could still perform some batching to minimize the number of
NetBufferLists that must be created and sent to the miniport.
Additionally, the socket style approach to the user space classes could be changed
to be more ecient. Currently, users allocate a buer and write their data to it and
then pass that buer to the socket library. Since the user typically only writes data
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and not a full frame, the socket library must allocate a new buer with enough space
to add the other headers (i.e., Ethernet and IP). The user's data must then be copied
into the new buer. A more ecient approach would be for the user to request a
buer of a specic size and have the socket library return a pointer to the buer. The
socket library would create a single buer with enough room for the missing headers
and return a pointer to the user data section of the buer. This way, the user would
be writing their data directly into the correct location without requiring a second
memory allocation and copy by the underlying socket library.
By removing interrupts and reducing the number of memory allocations and
copies, this model should be even more ecient than the current architecture being
used. It could be taken even further by directly mapping the miniport registers so
that they are shared with user space, but that limits the driver to specic NICs.
14
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT
To verify that the architecture works well in measurement scenarios, an experiment
was performed based on the Turbo King system. Turbo King involves using a list
of open, recursive resolvers and forcing them to send DNS queries to each other by
using specially crafted responses.
4.1 Setup
In order to perform the experiment, an authoritative DNS server was required. An
authority is required so that recursive resolvers will acknowledge the response we
sent as credible. A domain name is also required so that we can direct trac to
our authoritative server. Originally, the domain name for our research lab was used
(irl.cse.tamu.edu). This domain is delegated from the university resolvers to a dier-
ent server which answers all queries for the domain. With dns.irl.cse.tamu.edu being
used as the domain for tests, a third server was used as its authoritative name server
as well as the actual experiment server. Once the authoritative servers were added to
the target servers' caches, the university and lab resolvers should not be contacted.
However, we found that many extra lookups were being made directly to the lab au-
thority server and it was unable to sustain the workload. This created a bottleneck in
the experiment, so a dierent domain was required. irl-dns.info was then registered
with the experiment server set as the primary name servers. Trac would no longer
be sent through the university or lab resolvers, it would all be directed through this
single machine. Since this server was running the driver previously described, the
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workload would be easily managed.
The change to a new registrar did not go as smoothly as anticipated. A short test
was performed to ensure that the .INFO resolvers and the test server could manage
the workload of the experiment. The test was identical to the experiment, except
that the duration was only a few minutes instead of hours. Everything ran without
issue, until the next attempt which resulted in a large number of failed responses.
The responses were not errors, but timeouts. After a quick diagnosis, it was found
that the .INFO resolvers were dropping all requests for the new domain. Inspection
of the domain's registration status showed that we were now in a blocked state. After
explaining the purpose of the domain to the registrar and their subsidiaries, the
domain was unblocked. While they did not provide a reason for blocking the domain,
it was most likely blocked because they thought it belonged to malware. The domains
being used in the test all have short TTLs to avoid cache pollution, so they may have
looked like fast ux domains [22]. Additionally, the naming convention used for the
test domains may have been mistaken as being generated by a domain generation
algorithm which is often employed by malware [37].
In order to perform a test involving high throughput, a large number of open,
recursive resolvers would be required. To avoid performing a scan of the entire In-
ternet, a list obtained from a scan in 2008 was used. Another scan could be easily
performed, but they often cause complaints to be sent to the university's network
department if an intrusion detection system detects the scan. The previous scan con-
tained 125,000 servers that were still active. To reduce the risk of being detected by
intrusion detection systems, IPs belonging to the same subnets needed to be removed.
Furthermore, it should be sucient to test only one server in each BGP prex since
the other servers in the same prex should be relatively close to the chosen target. A
current listing of BGP prexes was obtained from Route Views [39] and it was found
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that 24,000 unique BGP prexes were contained in the list of active servers from the
previous scan. This was sucient to perform the experiment, so another scan was
deemed unnecessary.
4.1.1 Scanning Algorithm
The algorithm used for selecting which servers to measure must be ecient and have
minimal impact on the target hosts. The algorithm must meet the following criteria:
maximum politeness, maximum stealth, scalable, resumable, and allow for changes in
the host selection. The measurement scan must be polite in the sense that we do not
want to overburden the machines performing the measurements. If the hosts become
too busy, delays will be introduced, which invalidates the measurement. The mea-
surement scan should be stealth so that intrusion detection systems are not alerted,
causing the scan to be blocked. The algorithm should be scalable and work on mea-
surement matrices of any size. The amount of memory required for the algorithm to
operate should not grow to the point where it is not feasible to perform an Internet
scale scan. Large scale measurements cannot be performed instantly, so it may be
necessary for a measurement scan to be stopped partway through. The algorithm in
use should allow for the scan to be stopped and resumed at a later time. It should
also allow for changes in the host selection. If a host becomes unavailable during the
measurement scan, it should be possible to replace the host with a new one, without
the need to stop the scan.
Leonard et al. [24] introduced the idea of a reverse linear congruential generator.
It uses a normal linear congruential generator with constants known to produce a
random distribution, xi = (214; 013)xi 1 + 2; 531; 011. The bits of the resulting 32
bit integer are then reversed. This is stored the next IP address for use in their scan.
They go on to show that it does produce an uncorrelated sequence of addresses.
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For our purposes, we will use two RLCGs to produce the scanning matrix axes.
This ensures that both the source and target selections are randomized, which will
make the scan achieve maximum politeness. In addition to a suciently random host
selection, the TKing client will use 16 dierent source IP addresses for performing
the experiment. This will aid in achieving maximum stealth. With multiple source
addresses, intrusion detection systems will be less likely to detect the scan.
Once the matrix is formed, hosts are selected along the diagonal to perform
measurements. A single diagonal is measured at a time, with some time allowed for
responses to return before the diagonal is shifted by one for the next set of measure-
ments. This method of scanning requires a minimal amount of memory for operation,
even at an Internet scale. The two RLCG seeds require a total of eight bytes of mem-
ory, the iteration count requires four bytes of memory, and the two lists of IP addresses
will require a maximum of 3.6MB (475,000 addresses at four bytes each). The scan
order can be seen in Figure 3, where an X indicates a pair that has been skipped
since both the source and destination IP are the same.
Should the scan need to be stopped, the seeds and iteration counts can be stored
to disk. When the scan is resumed, the seeds can be restored, the matrix axes
recomputed from the RLCGS, and the iteration count used to advance the RLCGs
to their last location. The measurements will then resume exactly from where they
left o.
In the event that a host becomes unavailable, it is possible to update the two
arrays of IP addresses which serve as the axes of the matrix. The two entries can
simply be updated with a new host from the same BGP prex and the scanning
algorithm will be unaected. No further changes are necessary.
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Fig. 3. Scanning order for hosts A through E
4.2 Operation
The experiment used 20,000 IPs which belonged to unique BGP prexes, randomized
according to the scanning algorithm. Each diagonal of the matrix was tested over a
period of two seconds to further decrease the risk of overburdening any of the hosts
involved in the experiment. The test performed between each pair of IPs typically
consists of six DNS queries, but can require several more depending on how the target
servers behave. Given a pair of servers, A with IP 1.0.0.0 and B with IP 2.0.0.0, the
ideal test path can be seen in Figure 4. To ensure that the irl-dns.info name
server information is in the servers' caches, we initially seed all of the servers with an
initial recursive query for heartbeat.irl-dns.info. Any servers that did not have the
name server information in their cache should add it at this point. The .INFO TLD
name servers provide our records with a one day TTL, which is sucient for the time
frame of the experiment.
The rst query issued by our TKing client is a recursive query for an A record for
A-B.irl-dns.info to server A. Server A will then send an iterative request to our au-
thoritative server requesting the IP address for A-B.irl-dns.info. We reply with a
referral to server B. The referral consists of a NS record for ns-A-B.irl-dns.info
in the authority record section and an A record for ns-A-B.irl-dns.info with
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2 IQ A-B.irl-dns.info
1  R Q  A- B . i r l - d n s. i n f o
3 Referral: 2.0.0.0
4 IQ A-B.irl-dns.info
5 Answer: ERROR
6 Answer: ERROR
T1
T2
T3
IQ: Iterative Query
RQ: Recursive 
Query
T#: Timestamp
irl-dns.info
Client
Server
A
1.0.0.0
B
2.0.0.0TK
in
g
Fig. 4. Turbo King
server B's IP address in the additional record section. The additional record is
provided to avoid an extra query back to our name server for the IP address of
ns-A-B.irl-dns.info. Since we are the authoritative server for irl-dns.info, the IP
address should be accepted and cached.
At this point, server A should send an iterative request to server B for
A-B.irl-dns.info. Server B is not authoritative for that domain and should respond
with an error. Server A will then send an error response back to the TKing client
indicating a failure.
It is possible to determine the delay between servers A and B by taking times-
tamps after sending request 1, receiving request 2, and receiving the error code at
request 6. The delay can be computed using d36  d12, where d36 is the time between
requests 3 and 6 and d12 is the time between requests 1 and 2.
The experiment was performed over a period of 11 hours, operating at 150,000
packets per second with a throughput of 120Mbps. This server, which was used as
both the TKing client and server, maintained a CPU usage of roughly 20% for the
entirety of the scan.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Ideally, only six queries would be sent in total during this experiment; however, there
are several intermediate queries that occur which can aect the timing measurement.
The original King and Turbo King papers do not make any mention of extra requests
that may be generated during the test. Either these queries are the result of changes
in the DNS software running on the servers, or the queries were somehow missed
during the original assessments.
5.1 Queries Received by the Server
In addition to the queries shown in Figure 4, there are NS record requests for the
primary domain, A, AAAA, and A6 record requests for both of the primary name
servers (ns1.irl-dns.info and ns2.irl-dns.info), and A, AAAA, and A6 record
requests for ns-A-B.irl-dns.info. This experiment was performed a second time,
with a prex of \facebook-" applied to the domain names. This was to evaluate
the eects of censorship on the links. The tables below show statistics from that
experiment.
Type Iterative Recursive
A 822,934,601 1,796,925
NS 779,083 0
TXT 80,300 0
Table II. Queries sent to TKing server, for facebook-#-#.irl-dns.info
The requests for the test domains were fairly reasonable. Table II shows that
we received double the amount of A requests than we issued because most of the
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hosts sent a query to both of our name servers. The 1.8 million recursive requests
were somewhat unexpected. Since the target servers are all recursive resolvers, they
should send us an iterative query and not a recursive query. There may be a bug in
some of the hosts' resolvers which are not changing the query type bit when sending
the next query.
Type Iterative Recursive
A 118,502,656 0
AAAA 1,566,715,884 113,904
A6 27,350,904 0
Table III. Queries sent to TKing server, for ns-facebook-#-#.irl-dns.info
As can be seen in Table III, the bulk of the trac during the experiment came
from lookups for the intermediate name server for the test domain (ns-facebook).
This is the name we use as the authoritative server for the test domain. When server
A comes to us asking for facebook-A-B.irl-dns.info, we provide an NS record
stating that
ns-facebook-A-B.irl-dns.info is the authority for that domain. We also provide
an A record in the additional section providing B's IP address for
ns-facebook-A-B.irl-dns.info. Since we are the authority server for irl-dns.info,
resolvers should be using the information provided in the additional section. How-
ever, many servers still request A records. This indicates that server A did not trust
the information it was provided. If a DNS resolver properly implements bailiwick
rules and checks that we set the authority bit, there should be no reason to ignore
the records provided.
In July 2000, the A6 resource record type was proposed to map domain names
to IPv6 addresses and replace the AAAA resource record [10]. The A6 record type
was later downgraded to experimental status in August 2002 [6]. ISC's BIND added
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support for A6 record requests in version 9.0.0, which was released in September 2000.
In October of 2003, BIND version 9.2.3 was released which removed their usage of
A6 during normal lookups. However, even after ten years, there are still resolvers
running versions of BIND which issue these requests as part of the normal lookup
process. During the experiment, they accounted for over 30 million lookups.
The 1.6 billion AAAA requests was not anticipated. Initially, it was observed
that several resolvers continued to issue AAAA requests after the experiment ended.
Since the experiment was not designed with IPv6 support, the requests were originally
responded to with an empty response which indicates that another record for the
domain exists. After changing the response to an error code (Not Implemented), those
hosts stopped issuing requests. The result, however, was the 1.6 billion requests.
Type Count
ns1.irl-dns.info ns2.irl-dns.info
A 42,377 46,856
AAAA 38,817,051 38,812,238
A6 5,107,092 5,106,673
Table IV. Iterative queries sent to TKing server, for primary name servers
The primary domain's name servers also suered from a large number of IPv6
requests, as can be seen in Table IV.
Since both the recommended method of an empty recordset and the Not Imple-
mented error code did not appear to reduce the amount of AAAA requests, several
small experiments were performed with varying responses given. Each test was the
full experiment in scope, except that it was only run for ten minutes. The results are
shown in Table V. An empty response indicates that no record of type AAAA ex-
isted, but there are other records for the domain available. This is the recommended
approach to use. Returning an error code is not recommended, but certain error
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Response Type Code Queries Received
Empty 0 2,178,424
Name Error 3 2,202,844
Refused 5 4,566,869
SOA 0 4,462,500
Not Implemented 4 6,597,407
Table V. AAAA queries received with error codes sent
codes are less damaging than others. Name Error and Refused are not that kind. It
is recommended not to use this for fear of resolvers misinterpreting their meaning. In
the past, resolvers have treated a Name Error as an error for every record request for
the domain, instead of just the AAAA request. So if both an A and AAAA request
were in-ight at the same time, but the AAAA response came back rst with a Name
Error, the resolver would report that the domain did not exist; instead of returning
the answer that came with the A response [30]. The same issue occurred with re-
fusals; some servers treated it as if the server refused all queries. An error code of
Not Implemented was deemed as less harmful, but from the above results this is the
most poorly supported error code for AAAA requests. The Start of Authority (SOA)
response is similar to an empty response in that it does not contain an answer. It does
contain, however, a SOA record in the authoritative records section of the response.
The reasoning behind this is that it contains a Minimum TTL eld, which resolvers
should make note of before sending another request for the same record. Since the
test lasted only ten minutes and the minimum TTL value was set to an hour, it does
not seem to be the case that resolvers are checking this properly.
While SOA records can be returned to provide resolvers with extra information
[29], there is little incentive to do this during the experiment if it doubles the amount
of AAAA trac and requires additional bandwidth. The most ecient response is
to reply with an empty response with an OK return code. Name Error also showed
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minimal results, but due to the concerns previously mentioned it should not be used.
Type Iterative Recursive
A 14 2
AAAA 16 0
NS 1,263,124 508
CNAME 20 0
SOA 2 2
MX 20 2
DS 28 0
ANY 0 2
Table VI. Queries sent to TKing server, for irl-dns.info
The behavior shown in Table VI is very curious. There are resolvers which are
asking for NS records for the primary domain, irl-dns.info. This is interesting
because the .INFO TLD provides these records. If a server is asking us directly for
them, it would seem to indicate a partial lack of trust between the resolver and the
TLD. One possible explanation is that the resolver is attempting to verify that our
name servers have not changed, but it should not be requesting them so frequently.
The TTL provided by the .INFO TLD is one day, while the TTL provided by our own
server for those records is one week. With a measurement being performed every two
seconds, the resolver should not evict our records from their cache unless they were
extremely busy. Not only must the resolver decide to verify our NS records, but also
choose to not cache them.
The full set of interactions that occurred during the experiment can be seen
in Figure 5. An arrow pointing down indicates a query that we received and an
arrow pointing up indicates a response that we sent. Each column represents the
domains being requested, with arrows grouped together by row based on the query
type issued (i.e., A, AAAA, NS). Each arrow is also labeled with a number indicating
which phase it is part of. Below the arrows is a count of how many of each packet
type occurred. For labels under arrows in both directions, the count is the number
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Fig. 5. Turbo King: Actual queries received
of packets sent or received in only one direction since it is mirrored in the other
direction. The experiment begins at phase one, with the request we send for the
test domain A-B.irl-dns.info. Phases two and three are extra requests about the
primary domain, irl-dns.info. Phase four is when server A contacts us about the
domain and we send a referral. It also contains extra responses for when server A does
not use the additional records of the referral or requests IPv6 information (AAAA
and A6 requests). Phases ve, six, and seven are the last steps of the TKing process
where server B is queried and the error is sent back to server A and then on to us.
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5.1.1 Queries With Error Codes
The TKing server received 102,874 queries with the return code set to Server Failure;
primarily from nine hosts. The original packet received by a resolver is often used
to create the response since the DNS header elds and question remain the same.
One possible explanation for queries with return codes is that there is a bug in the
resolvers causing the query/response bit to not be ipped from \query" to \response."
5.2 Return Codes Received by the Client
During the nal step of the measurement process, an error code should be returned
by server A indicating that server B did not have any information about the domain
we requested. The most appropriate error code in this case would be Server Failure
(code 2), which indicates that there was a problem with the name server. While many
resolvers return this error code, several do not. The set of return codes received by
the TKing client can be seen in Table VII.
Response Type Code Responses Received
Format Error 1 60,383
Server Failure 2 353,458,498
Name Error 3 113,647
Refused 5 1,150,025
Table VII. Return codes for responses sent to TKing client
The Format Error and Name Error codes were primarily caused by only a few
hosts. Seven hosts accounted for 99.9% of the Format Errors, with only 20 other hosts
providing one or two responses with this error. Name Errors were also dominated
by seven hosts, accounting for 62.7% of the errors. Many other hosts accounted for
the remaining errors, only contributing a few responses each. While most of these
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hosts only responded two or three times with a name error, three destination hosts
frequently appeared as the target server of the measurement. These three hosts
accounted for 36.1% of the name errors. The Refused error code was presented by
209 hosts, with 140 of them replying with the error more than 5,000 times.
While Refused errors are understandable since the target server most likely re-
turned the refusal and the source server forwarded it on, the Name Errors should
not occur. A Name Error is only useful when it is returned by servers which are
authoritative for the domain in question.
5.3 Queries Received by the Client
The TKing client should only perform two steps: send a question to server A about
server B and receive the response to that question. While this was how it operated
for the majority of the time, a few queries were actually received by the client. Of
these queries, 4,437 were the same queries which the clients themselves were sent.
Over half of these queries came from the Verizon network. The host sending the most
recursive requests back to the client was a Verizon digital video recorder (DVR). The
rest of the hosts were largely various brands of home routers.
In addition to the queries that were sent back to the client, we also received
two sets of peculiar queries. The rst set of queries was a request for the root.
What makes the request interesting is that the request contained records for the root
servers. This does not appear to be malicious since the records provided were all
correct. We received 16,132 of these requests, all of which originated from an IP
address operated by the European Fusion Development Agreement Task Force. The
other set of queries we received was a completely blank packet; the UDP payload was
512 bytes of zeros. This is technically a valid packet, but it asks no questions and
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contains 500 bytes of padded zeros at the end. We received 11,474 of these requests
from Travelsky Technology Limited (a Chinese public aviation company) and 34 from
the China Aviation Computer Information Center.
5.4 Non-Error Responses Sent to the Client
The responses sent to the TKing client should only consist of non-zero return codes,
indicating an error. Most of the responses were indeed marked as errors, but 13 million
of them used a return code of OK (code 0). Table VIII shows response counts for
the test domains (facebook-A-B.irl-dns.info) which contained extra records, but no
answer records. The remaining 7 million records contained an answer section and will
be discussed in the next chapter.
Response Type Count
facebook-A-B.irl-dns.info
NS and Additional records 989,731
NS records only 761
irl-dns.info
NS records only 154,831
NS and Additional records 30,433
NS records + 1 Additional 9,138
Other
No records 4,931,031
Roots and .com records 19,727
Roots 5,411
.info records 4,697
Roots subset 489
Table VIII. Responses returned to TKing client with OK status code
Roughly 1 million of the responses contained the name servers for the test do-
mains (ns-facebook-A-B.irl-dns.info) and its IP address in the additional section. A
few of those only contained the name server records in the authority section. We also
30
received about 200,000 responses which contained records for the primary domain
(irl-dns.info). The responses either contained just an authority section with both NS
records, both NS records and both IP addresses, or one NS record and its IP address.
These responses appear to be terminating the lookup early and are simply passing
the referral back to the sender instead of resolving it completely.
Almost 5 million of the responses did not contain any records at all. The response
only contained the question and an OK return code. There were also responses which
contained information about the root servers or the other top level domains (TLDs).
20,000 of the responses contained authority and additional records for the 13 root
servers and the 13 .COM name servers. 5,400 contained records for just the 13 root
servers. 5,600 of them contained authority and additional records for the .INFO name
servers. Lastly, 500 responses contained records for just six of the root servers. It
is not uncommon for a non-authoritative name server to send a referral back to the
root servers or to the TLD's name servers, but since these are recursive requests, the
recursive resolver should not be returning the referrals back to the sender. Server A
should be following the referral to completion or returning an error.
5.4.1 Headers Only
A valid DNS response should contain a return code indicating the state of the re-
sponse, the domain for which the original query was issued, and, if applicable, re-
source records containing information about the domain. Like many protocols, the
DNS protocol is prone to attack. If an attacker can inject a malicious record into a
resolver's cache, many unsuspecting users can be sent to a malicious site instead of
their original destination. For this reason, it is important to verify DNS responses to
ensure that they match the question that was asked and contain reasonable answers.
Verication should check that the source port, transaction ID, and question match
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that of the original query.
Of the responses received by the TKing client, 737,262 of them contained only
the 12 byte DNS header with an error code set. The header contains information
such as the transaction ID, number of questions, number of answers, and so on.
What it does not contain is the domain requested or other resource records. The
only verication which can be performed is on the transaction ID and source port. If
a resolver only performs checks based on the transaction ID alone, an attacker can
easily perform a Denial of Service attack on the resolver by exhausting all transaction
IDs and responding with an error code. No resolver should ever accept a response
with the DNS header alone, and no resolver should ever send such a reply. These
responses came from 72 hosts, with the majority of the responses coming from France,
Germany, and Brazil. The set of return codes used by these responses can be seen in
IX.
Response Type Code Responses Received
Server Failure 2 514,494
Format Error 1 220,220
Refused 5 2,548
Table IX. Return codes for header-only responses
Upon manual inspection of the top 50 IP addresses, which account for 99.99%
of the responses, 10 of the devices were manufactured by bintec [41]. There was also
a Cisco router, an Untangle router [42], three broadband modems, and two phone
systems. The remaining devices did not present a response to a HTTP request for
identication.
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5.4.2 Other Responses
We also received a few responses which were malformed or possibly malicious. There
were 78 responses from Chinanet IP addresses which were classied as malformed.
Upon inspection, the data did not appear to be DNS trac. The packets may have
been for another protocol, but it was impossible to tell which one as the contents did
not contain ASCII strings that may have helped in its identication.
While those packets may have been benign, but misdirected, 23 of the responses
may have been sent with malicious intent. These responses contained the results of
an ANY request for isc.org. The response is 3,000 bytes long. This is suspected as
malicious due to their prominent use in DNS amplication attacks [8]. Since this was a
response and not a request, we were specically the target in this case. The number of
responses was extremely small and originated from only two hosts. Interestingly, one
of those hosts was the European Fusion Development Agreement Task Force which
was previously mentioned for sending root requests while providing the answers. The
other host was from within the Ngee Ann Polytechnic network.
5.5 Bogus Questions
During the experiment, we received both queries and responses for domains which we
are not authoritative for. While one was a crawler, the rest appeared to be mistakes.
5.5.1 Queries to Client
The TKing client received the least amount of incorrect queries. It received several
queries from internal networks within the university which were broadcasting requests,
it received several from a DNSSEC crawler (http://www.dnssecready.net/) checking
for DNSSEC capability, but the only two interesting queries came from the Verizon
33
network. Those queries can be seen in Table X.
Question Count
1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa 9
www.myspace.com 2
Table X. Queries sent to TKing client
5.5.2 Responses to Client
The TKing client also received 400 responses for 200 kinds of questions we did not
ask.
Question Count
sabi.np.edu.sg 45
nova.np.edu.sg 33
lc2.midhq.gov.sg 21
activation.windstream.com 14
verify.kx8.cn 14
isc.org 12
secdns1.MIDHQ.GOV.SG 11
Table XI. Top responses sent to TKing client
Two hosts showed up several times in the responses: the Ngee Ann Polytechnic
university and the Windstream ISP. Aside from what is in Table XI, Polytechnic
also requested several reverse lookups for its own IP addresses. Polytechnic has been
mentioned previously for being used to send the 3,000 byte isc.org responses. The
isc.org requests are present here as well, but their requests were less than 512 bytes
in size.
The responses showed great variance in the questions being returned. Some of the
domains included: logmein.com, cisco.com, msn.com, gmail.com, and facebook.com.
The responses all contained legitimate records for their respective domains and did
not contain malicious entries. There was only one instance that had the potential to
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be malicious. One of the responses was for the query \localhost" and a record was
returned. The source of the response was from a Chinese ISP, Chinanet, providing
a record pointing to another address within Chinanet. It is possible that the ISP
was simply responding to a lookup for \localhost" and returning the user's own IP
address, but the query was somehow redirected to us.
5.5.3 Queries to Server
The TKing server received 310 queries for three types of domains. There were
two recursive requests for www.irl-dns.info, which were most likely performed man-
ually. The rest of the queries were iterative and t into two formats: <random
string>.facebook-A-B.irl-dns.info and ns-A-B.irl-dns.info.
An example of the rst type is ealhnhaaaaesb0000dkaaabbaacbaggj.facebook-
04814-09467.irl-dns.info. The string at the beginning partially changes between queries.
It does not appear to actually be random, but block based. The rst six characters
always change, but the next ve are always \aaaae" followed by two letters which
are either \sb", \ka", or \ra". The next ve characters are always \0000d" followed
by a single random letter and then the string \aaabbaacb" with the last four digits
being random. One possible explanation is that this is a delegated DNS server which
is attaching an authentication token to the question before forwarding it. A similar
approach is used by Pagekite [34], but the authentication token format is dierent.
Interestingly, the source server of the test domain was almost always the same. Only
two queries used a dierent source, the rest were all for 04814. Even though the source
of the experiment was always the same, the hosts which were sending these queries to
the TKing server varied. The queries came from Google, Indonesia, and China. This
is most likely a bug where the forwarding server is not removing the authentication
token before resolving the domain. This query type appeared 175 times.
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The second query form (ns-A-B.irl-dns.info) may be a bug in the resolver which
has somehow removed \facebook" from the name server address (ns-facebook-A-B.irl-
dns.info). This query type appeared 131 times.
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CHAPTER VI
ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
6.1 Censorship and Forwarders
A recent report [3] claimed that China's censorship of DNS trac created collateral
damage on networks that were not actually part of China's own networks. We per-
formed our scan a second time and pre-pended the query with \facebook" to see if
we received any censored results. Normally, we should receive an error message from
server A since we are issuing a fake request. However, in the case of censorship, we
will receive an answer with an IP instead of an error.
The results we found were quite underwhelming; only 1.7% of the results came
back with an IP address. We did see that some of our requests were being censored,
but all of these requests did actually pass through a network in China. We did not
nd any signs of censorship between pairs of nodes that did not exist within a Chinese
network as the paper suggested. The original study used 43,482 open resolvers in 173
countries for their study. While we only used 20,000 servers, we did perform all-
to-all measurements between them, which covers far more routes than the original
study. The servers in our study spanned 171 countries including Japan, China, Korea,
Canada, Australia, Germany, Russia, Taiwan, and Indonesia. It is unlikely that none
of the countries tested never passed through a network within China. It is possible
that the ltering rules are not simply keyword based or that the routes in our study
did not happen to pass through a censored network.
The main nding of this investigation was that the bulk of the requests that
received a fake response were not being censored, but were being redirected. Of
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the 6.9 million requests that returned an IP address instead of an error code, 85%
were OpenDNS redirects to their \Domain not found" search page. Only 6% of the
requests were to a site on a Chinese network, but either one or both of the hosts in
the measurement were within a Chinese network. The remaining 9% were primarily
redirects to corporate \Domain not found" pages, such as ISPs and hotels. This result
is not surprising. For the last three years, OpenDNS has grown by 100%, increasing
their coverage to 50 million users. Our own university's local resolvers now forward to
OpenDNS as well. The number of forwarding DNS resolvers will most likely continue
to increase as more companies make use of commercial services such as OpenDNS.
6.2 Potential Improvements
While Turbo King managed to remove several unnecessary queries from the original
King process, we wanted to investigate the possibility of adding more improvements.
If we consider only one test at a time, those six queries are the absolute best we can
do. However, if we consider caching and planning for future tests between nodes, is
it possible to provide some answers ahead of time to reduce the amount of trac?
Is it also possible to request multiple tests in one query? These kinds of questions
are subject to ambiguities in the DNS specication, which in turn makes the results
specic to certain DNS resolver implementations.
6.2.1 Test Seeding
Since we are performing tests between every IP pairing, we will be visiting each
sever multiple times. Additionally, since we know the order in which the tests will
be performed, we also know the next servers that we will be requesting server A to
contact. With this information, it would be benecial to preload server A's cache
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with the IP addresses of the future targets. The reason for this is that it would
remove one RTT between us and server A (requests 2 and 3) and would also reduce
the overall bandwidth requirement since we can benet from answer compression.
The idea is to provide records for future name servers and their IPs when server A
asks for that information about the current test. In addition to receiving ns-A-B.irl-
dns.info, it would receive ns-A-C.irl-dns.info, ns-A-D.irl-dns.info, and so on. Since
our server is the authoritative server for the irl-dns.info domain, this information
should be accepted by DNS resolvers. It turns out, however, that not all resolvers
consider this valid. Microsoft's DNS resolver module accepts these answers and does
indeed cache them, but ISC's BIND considers this a formatting error and discards the
extra records. Since BIND holds 75% of the DNS resolver market share, they are the
primary factor as to whether this optimization would work. With BIND rejecting the
extra records, this method would actually increase the amount of bandwidth required,
which is counterproductive.
The DNS specication allows multiple questions to be provided, but does not
specify how the response should be crafted. Possible responses could contain answers
to both questions, but that has problems when the error codes are dierent. There
could be two responses sent, but they would be sharing a transaction ID, which is
not ideal. Due to these ambiguities, BIND, Microsoft, PowerDNS, and several others
have chosen to send a format error code when multiple questions are provided in a
single request.
6.2.2 Zero TTLs
The Turbo King paper briey noted that a few resolvers do not properly handle
TTLs of zero. A zero length TTL indicates that a record is volatile and should only
be used for the current transaction. Like Turbo King, we also found servers which
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behaved improperly when given records with a zero TTL. The resolvers would repeat
the query multiple times until they eventually gave up. One possible explanation for
this is a DNS resolver which places the record into the cache before using it. Once
the resolver attempts to process the pending request, the information is no longer in
the cache and must be fetched again. While cache pollution is an important aspect to
keep in mind while performing large scale tests, having servers repeatedly requesting
the same domain increases the amount of trac. For this experiment, a small TTL
value of 30 seconds was found to be sucient for reducing the amount of repeated
queries.
6.2.3 Halving the Bandwidth Requirement
Due to a requirement by our domain registrar, two name servers were provided for
the irl-dns.info domain. As a result of this, the amount of trac doubled during
the experiment. This can be easily seen in Table II where we received 800 million
requests instead of the expected 400 million. Most resolvers sent a record request
to both of the name servers. For intermediate lookups, the resolvers would tend
to round-robin the requests between our two servers. One possible way to reduce
bandwidth would be to nd a registrar which allows the use of only one name server.
This is unlikely, as RFC 2182 [14] actually recommends the use of three to seven
resolvers. It may be possible, however, to use a subdomain for the tests and have
the subdomain's authority delegated to a single server. For example, the new test
domain could be A-B.m.irl-dns.info, with a separate name server being responsible
for m.irl-dns.info.
During the experiment's setup, the heartbeat query would be changed to
hearbeat.m.irl-dns.info which would cause the authoritative server for the m.
irl-dns.info subdomain to be cached. When the experiment is performed, the two
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primary name servers will no longer receive queries regarding the experiment and
only the one delegated for the subdomain will receive queries. With only one server
being authoritative for the subdomain, the amount of queries sent should be reduced
by half.
Normal Subdomain
NS1 84,081 2,253
NS2 83,652 2,335
NS3 0 169,031
Table XII. Iterative requests received by each name server
A short experiment was performed which used only 300 hosts and the subdo-
main of m.irl-dns.info served solely by ns3.irl-dns.info. The experiment was
performed again using the normal naming convention, with the same 300 hosts. The
results are shown in Table XII. We did achieve the desired eect of directing nearly
all of the trac to the single name server, however, we still received twice the amount
of requests for both tests. The most likely cause for this is that many recursive
resolvers issue two lookups regardless of how many unique name servers a host has.
6.3 Increasing Accuracy
Due to the existence of previously unmentioned query paths, delay measurements can
become inated if timestamps are taken too early. The method described in King
and Turbo King rely on knowing the time at which step three begins. This step is
when our server returns a referral to server A about server B. Our experiment showed
that server A may send additional queries depending on its trust behavior regarding
the additional record section of a response. If server A makes additional queries, the
timestamp should not be taken until server A makes its last query. This is the most
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likely point at which server A will then query B and will provide the most accurate
measurement.
6.4 Architectures for Large Scale Scanning
By the end of our experiment, roughly 13% of the hosts had stopped responding.
Before the test began, each host was checked to ensure that the server was still
an open, recursive resolver. Many of the hosts that stopped responding belonged
to residential ISPs, such as Verizon and Cox Communications, which frequently re-
assign user IP addresses. This would cause the target host to move without our
knowledge and the new host may not have the capability to perform DNS resolution.
In order to peform an Internet scale scan, each BGP prex will need to have multiple
hosts available for redundancy. If one host stops responding, it can be replaced with
another host in that BGP space. There are currently over 475,000 prexes and 2.6
billion IP addresses announced through BGP [19].
6.4.1 Dynamic Scanning
Ideally, one would scan the Internet and perform delay measurements at the same
time so as to obtain the most relevant results. As soon as an open recursive resolver
is found, it is added to a list of available resolvers and measurements would begin.
There are a few diculties to overcome though. The rst is that we would like to
cause minimal impact on the networks where these resolvers reside. We currently
do this using a reversed linear congruential generator, which guarantees that the IP
space is randomly distributed and no resolver would be accessed more frequently than
the others. If hosts are used as they are found, the earlier hosts will be performing
more scans than the new ones. One way around this would be to divide the complete
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scanning matrix into blocks of a smaller size. Once enough hosts have been found to
measure the entire block, the measurements can begin. While the scan and measure-
ments continue, new hosts can be found for the next block of the matrix. This would
at least allow us to guarantee some distribution of the address space in each block.
The second problem occurs when hosts are no longer available. As previously
mentioned, residential ISPs may change a host's address and measurements will no
longer be available. As the IP space is scanned, multiple hosts for each BGP prex
can be stored in the instance that one goes away. The new host will need to be
checked again before it is used to ensure that the host is still active. If it is active, it
can serve as the replacement. If there are no replacements available, then there will
be holes in the measurement matrix. In order to revisit the missing measurements,
the holes will need to be tracked and stored somehow. It is not possible to store
the entire scanning matrix in memory due to its size (225.6 billion entries), and it is
unlikely that the matrix required for missing measurements will t in memory either
if it shows a 13% migration rate like the experiment. If missing measurements are
stored on disk, each time a new BGP prex host is found, all missing measurements
will need to be evaluated to see if the prex is required to complete them. The old
measurements cannot be immediately performed though, as the new host would be
bombarded with measurements, which goes against our desire to evenly distribute the
amount of work any single server must perform. The missing measurements would
have to wait until no current block of the matrix requires their BGP prexes. Even
then, there must be enough missing prexes found so that a matrix block can be
formed in such a way that the hosts will not be queried too quickly.
Ensuring that no measurements are missed and that no hosts are overworked
makes developing a framework in this manner quite complex.
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6.4.2 Static Matrix
Rather than attempting to complete any missing measurements as soon possible, they
can be delayed until later. A single scan is performed to nd possible hosts for each
BGP prex, without any measurements being performed. Once the hosts have been
found, a complete matrix is built in the same way as our original experiment. One
pass of the entire delay matrix is then performed. New hosts are found for any missing
prexes by scanning the redundancy lists created by the initial scan. Once new hosts
are veried, they are used to build a smaller scanning matrix and the scan begins
again. If hosts migrate during this scan, the process is repeated again. This continues
until all entries in the matrix have a measurement.
This method has a higher chance of hosts becoming unavailable for future scans
since they are not re-evaluated until the end of the rst scan. However, it does
provide for a more random distribution of the hosts participating in subsequent delay
measurements.
6.4.3 Pre-Screening
As was mentioned in the Results chapter, many hosts do not behave in the most ideal
manner. They can eventually stop responding, ignore error codes for AAAA records,
request records which have already been sent, or constantly need to request records
for the primary domain. These behaviors can all be detected prior to using a host
as part of the measurement matrix. After an initial scan has been performed to nd
potential hosts, they are monitored for several days. Each host is periodically sent a
request to test for undesired behaviors. If a host is found to be behaving in such a way,
it is removed from the pool of usable hosts. Once a set of stable and well-behaving
hosts is found, they can be used to perform the all-to-all delay measurement scan.
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In the case that a measurement is missed, it should be possible to simply replace the
host with one from the list of redundant hosts for that prex and continue on with
the experiment.
6.5 Forwarders
If a resolver does not actually perform the resolution itself, but forwards the request
to another server, delays will be introduced into the measurement. The Turbo King
paper explicitly removed forwarders by ensuring that only the target host contacts
the experiment servers. If other hosts are involved, then it is removed.
Query Response
Client 151 19,970
Server 37,798 0
Table XIII. Unique IP addresses contacting TKing client and server
During our experiment, we did not remove forwarders from the list of target
servers. The number of unique IP addresses participating in the experiment can be
seen in Table XIII. Unlike the delays caused by intermediate lookups, delays created
by forwarders should be consistent since the forwarder will be used for every test
domain. The goal of the delay measurements is to determine the amount of delay
between two hosts with the expectation of nding the actual time delay. The exact
time value is not actually important. Most applications really only need to know
which host is more optimal. For this purpose, a relative time measurement can be
used. The delay introduced by a forwarder now becomes a constant which has no
impact on the actual measurement, since the goal is to only know which server has
the least delay.
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6.5.1 Minimum Delays
Once the matrix has been computed, it is possible to rene the measurements a bit
more. By inspecting the columns of the matrix, it is possible to nd the minimum
delay experienced for a particular host. With a full, Internet scale matrix, this will
represent the delay between the current host and its closest neighbor. This delay can
be used as a substitute for the host's propagation delay and subtracted from every
other measurement in the column. It can also be used to identify hosts which always
have a large delay and should be removed from future measurements. Hosts which
are routinely slow are either very busy or simply not suitable for delay measurements.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Delay measurements can provide useful metrics to a wide audience including re-
searchers, Internet engineers, businesses, and even gamers. Performing these mea-
surements quickly and eciently has not received much attention since accuracy is
typically more important. While Microsoft Windows is the most widely deployed
operating system [31], very little eort has been made towards performing high speed
measurements using that system.
We developed a custom driver to facilitate the use of the Windows operating
system for large scale measurements. This enabled us to perform a measurement
scan that was larger and faster than any previous study. We developed a novel scan-
ning algorithm and used it to perform 400 million measurements, generating over 3.4
billion packets in 11 hours. Analysis of the results revealed previously unidentied
drawbacks to the existing architectures and measurement methodologies. We pro-
posed novel methods for increasing the speed of experiments, improving the accuracy
of measurement results, reducing the amount of trac generated by the scan, and
further enhancements for Windows network drivers.
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